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THE BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
FAMILY PRESERVATION: THE FUTURE OF THE
PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN TEXAS
ROBERT L. GALLIGAN

The genius of the common law lies in its flexibility and its adaptability to the changing nature of human affairs and in its ability to
enunciate rights and to provide remedies for wrongs where previously none had been declared.'
In considering the history of the parent-child immunity doctrine, the
aforementioned statement appears to be peculiarly applicable. In many
instances, the doctrine has not only been modified but completely
abrogated. Recently, Texas has joined a growing majority of states in
adopting a less rigid and inflexible approach to this doctrine which has
previously equipped parents with an immunity from suits involving tort
actions brought by their children.
In Felderhoff v. Felderhoff,2 Texas altered its parent-child immunity
doctrine, insofar as it permitted a child to sue a parent when the injury
arose out of an employer-employee relationship. The direct holding of
the court, along with important dicta in the case, indicates that the
Texas Supreme Court may be willing to abolish the parent-child immunity doctrine with respect to most acts of ordinary negligence. A
study of recent decisions in other jurisdictions, coupled with an analysis
of this recent case, indicates the considerations which will be foremost
in the thinking of the court when it is faced with this problem. These
considerations can be more fully understood after evaluating the origin,
development, and subsequent erosion of the parent-child immunity
doctrine in other jurisdictions.
COMMON LAW VOID

The issue is, and must remain, an insoluble mystery.8
This quote is an irrebuttable conclusion of any discussion of the
English common law pertaining to torts between parent and child. The
silence which the English courts maintained on the issue of a child's
personal rights against a parent created this legal mystery. 4 The only
1 Rozell v. Rozell, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. 1939).
2 473 S.W.2d 928 (rex. Sup. 1971).

8 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 907 (N.H. 1930).
4 Id.
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relevant source of what the law might have been is recorded by 19th
century English text writers. 5 Reeve, in his treatise on domestic relations stated that he was of the opinion that a child may have an action
for damages resulting from a battery:
He may so chastise his child, as to be liable in an action by the
child against him for a battery .... The true ground on which this
ought to be placed, I apprehend, is that the parent ought to be considered as acting in a judicial capacity when he corrects; and, of
course, not liable for errors of opinion.... But when.., it appears
that the parent acted, malo animo, from wicked motives, under the
influence of an unsocial heart, he ought to be liable to damages.,
In opposition to this view, Cooley believed the policy of permitting
actions that invite a contest of the parent's authority was so questionable
that he doubted if the right would ever be sanctioned.7 Obviously in
agreement with this statement, an American writer of the 19th century
felt that even an action by an emancipated child against his parent was
".... abhorrent to the idea of family discipline which all nations, rude
or civilized, have so steadily inculcated, and the privacy and mutual
confidence which should obtain in the household."8
AMERICAN

ORIGIN

In 1891, the Mississippi Supreme Court, without citing authority,
composed the first judicial rule that a child does not have a cause of
action in tort against his parent. In Hewellette v. George,9 a daughter
sought a civil remedy against her mother for having her wrongfully and
maliciously imprisoned in an insane asylum. Reversing and remanding
to determine if the daughter had resumed her place in the home after
being separated from her husband, the court stated:
[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The
peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
5 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 907 (N.H. 1930); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, 43 HAiv. L. REV. 1030, 1059-1060 (1930).
6 T. REEVE, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 287 (1816), cited and quoted in McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1060 n.141 (1930). According
to McCurdy, Addison, Pollock, and Clark and Lindsell concurred in this opinion. McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1060 (1930).
7 T. CooLEY, TORTS 171 (1879), cited by McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relations, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1060 (1930).
8 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAIr. L. REV. 1030, 1060
n.147 (1930).
99 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
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public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the
best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.' 0
Hewellette claimed that the minor daughter had adequate protection
from parental violence and wrong-doing through the state's criminal
laws." The state has a duty to protect all of its citizens from violence
and wrong-doing, and this would be no less applicable to violence committed upon a child by his parent. Thus was born a rule of law of exceptional character, based totally on public policy.'2 The problem of
deciding exactly what this public policy is has led one eminent authority
' 18
to say, "[W]e are in the realm of belief and emotion.'
In 1903,14 the Tennessee Supreme Court was presented with the
problem of a minor child who brought suit against her father and stepmother to recover damages for injuries inflicted by the latter with consent of the father. Though citing Judge Cooley's observation that
"... in principle there seems to be no reason it [suit by minor against
parent in tort] should not be sustained,"' 15 the court was persuaded that
the void of such cases indicated adherence to the immunity rule.'6 Relying upon the policy reasons set out in Hewellette, 7 the Tennessee court
further imbedded the immunity rule in American jurisprudence. 8
Despite facts that would tend to make promulgation of the rule an
absurdity, the Supreme Court of Washington in 1905 also upheld the
rule born in Hewellette.1 Though recognizing merit in a suggestion to
limit the rule, the court believed a limitation as to certain torts would
only lead to confusion.20
Using these three cases as a foundation, many jurisdictions followed
10 Id. at 887.
11 Id. at 887.
12 Though discussing another area of common law, the court said: "What these cases
really did was to establish a new rule of exceptional character rather than enforce a
rule already established." Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 150 A. 540, 542
(N.H. 1930).
18 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030,
1076 (1930).
14 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
15 Id.
1l Id.

17 Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).

18 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (Tenn. 1903).
19 Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905). This was an action brought by a child for
civil redress from her father who had been criminally convicted of raping her.
20 ld. at 789. The court also believed that to allow the action would permit one child to
gain to the detriment of other children in the family.
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suit in adopting the parent-child immunity doctrine. 21 In spite of its
prevalence the doctrine was not adopted without judicial criticism.

A

22

FOUNDATION IS ESTABLISHED

The public policy considerations as promulgated in Hewellette,23
i.e., family harmony and parental discipline, are perhaps the leading
arguments for retaining the parental immunity rule. 24 The California
Supreme Court stated the general view as follows:
The reason of the rule which deprives a minor child of a right
of action against the parent for the tort of the latter is that proceedings of that nature tend to bring discord into
the family and
25
disrupt the peace and harmony of the household.
A 1923 North Carolina case, Small v. Morrison,26 considered most of
the reasons expounded for retaining the rule. The majority, while espousing the family harmony theory advanced in Hewellette, also considered other reasons. 27 One of these is the theory that to permit a minor
child to sue his father for a tortious wrong would allow the child to take
from his parent that which is already dedicated to the support and
28
maintenance of the family.

It would also allow one minor child to gain an advantage over his
minor brothers and sisters at the expense of the common fund
21 See, e.g., Farrar v. Farrar, 152 S.E. 278 (Ga. App. 1930); Smith v. Smith, 142 N.E. 128
(Ind. App. 1924); Elias v. Collins, 211 N.W. 88 (Mich. 1929); Taubert v. Taubert, 114 N.W.
763 (Minn. 1908); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 134
A. 184 (N.J. 1926); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 162 N.E. 551 (N.Y. 1928); Small v. Morrison,
118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923); Wick v. Wick, 212 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1927).
22 See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 17 (N.C. 1923) (Clark, J., dissenting); Wick v.
Wick, 212 N.W. 787, 788 (Wis. 1927) (Crownhart, J., dissenting).
Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932), appears to be an early decision
directly contrary to the immunity rule, but it has been suggested that the presence of
insurance and the fact that the minor son was acting as agent of the adult son was of
significance in the decision. Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the FamilyHusband and Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 184 n.170 (1961).
23 Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
24 See, e.g., Trudell v. Leatherby, 300 P. 7 (Cal. 1931); Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12
(N.C. 1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 131 A. 198 (R.I. 1925); Wick v. Wick, 212 N.W. 787
(Wis. 1927).
25 Trudell v. Leatherby, 300 P. 7, 8 (Cal. 1931). Another court stated: "Any justification
for the rule of parental immunity can be found only in a reluctance to create litigation
and strife between members of the family unit." Mudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531
(Ill. 1956).
26 Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923). In this case, the nine-year-old daughter
of J.C. Small brought action against her father, his insurer, and the driver of the automobile which collided with the one her father was driving. She was a passenger in her
father's automobile.
271d. at 14.
281d. at 14.
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which has been dedicated to a fair and equal support of them all.
And further, even taking the plaintiff's view, a suit would do no
more than award to the injured child that which the simple dictates
29
of family life may have already impressed with a trust in its favor.

The court in Small also believed that to allow such actions would destroy parental authority. This belief is illustrated by the following statement:
[N]o greater disservice could be rendered to any child than to teach
its feet to stray from the path of rectitude, or to suffer its mind to
be poisoned by ideas of disloyalty and dishonor ....

Hence, in a

democracy or a polity like ours, the government of a well-ordered
home is one of the surest bulwarks against the forces that make for
social disorder and civic decay. It is the very cradle of civilization ....

80

Finally, since the advent of insurance, the theory that to allow such
suits would enhance the possibility of fraud and collusion between the
injured party and the tort-feasor has been the concern of several
courts.8 ' However, this mere possibility has deterred few courts from
freely making their decisions on other grounds. 2 The collusion theory
was adequately dispelled in Gelbman v. Gelbman,3 wherein the court
countered:
The argument fails to explain how the possibility of fraud would
be magically removed merely by the child's attainment of legal
majority. Nor does the argument pretend to present the first instance in which there is the possibility of a collusive and fraudulent
suit. There are analogous situations in which we rely upon the
ability of the jury to distinguish between valid and fraudulent
claims. The effectiveness of the jury system will pertain in the
present situation. The definite and vital interest of society in protecting people
from losses resulting from accident should remain
4
paramount.8
It can be concluded that the preservation of family harmony and paId. at 15.
Id. at 15. Clark, J., countered in the dissent by offering the proposition that the immunity doctrine was not based on common law and was contrary to justice. He stated:
"Justice should be done to all. The complaints of all should be heard and wrongs, if
proven, redressed without distinction of race, of sex, or of age. 'For justice, all places are
a temple and all seasons summer.'" Id. at 25.
29
80

81 See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.D.C. 1948); Treachman v. Treachman,
61 N.E. 901 (Ind. 1901); Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E.2d 438 (Mass. 1938); Parks v. Parks, 135
A.2d 65 (Pa. 1957).
82 McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 ViLL. L. REV. 521, 546 (1960).
83 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969).
84 Id. at 194.
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rental authority, protection of the family exchequer, and the possibility
of collusion and fraud are the primary reasons courts continue to uphold
the rule.
THE FOUNDATION

BEGINS TO CRUMBLE:

EXCEPTIONS THAT DEVELOPED

In spite of the near-universal adoption of the rule,"8 a number of
qualifications and exceptions began to appear almost at its inception.86

The Emancipated Child
Though it appears that the court in Hewellette distinguished between
unemancipated and emancipated children,8 7 this distinction is sometimes
considered an exception. 8 The basis for this so-called exception is that
once emancipation has occurred, there is no longer the risk that family
harmony or discipline will be disrupted, since the child is considered
to be on his own.8 9
Willful and Malicious Torts
The first true deviation from the rule was the allowance of suits by
children against their parents for willful or malicious torts.40 The basis
of this exception was the belief that the family relationship had already
been disrupted to such an extent by the willful tort that any reason for
41
the immunity rule would no longer exist.
Certainly, as most courts recognize, there is little reason and much
injustice done by a rule that would bar a child's recovery from a mali35See, e.g., Farrar v. Farrar, 152 S.E. 278 (Ga. App. 1930); Smith v. Smith, 142 N.E.
128 (Ind. App. 1924); Elias v. Collins, 211 N.W. 88 (Mich. 1929); Taubert v. Taubert, 114
N.W. 763 (Minn. 1908); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930); Goldstein v. Goldstein,
134 A. 184 (N.J. 1926); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 162 N.E. 551 (N.Y. 1928); Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923); Wick v. Wick, 212 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1927). See also cases cited
in Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 202
n.13 (1967).
86 See generally Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 201, 206-218 (1967) for a more complete development of exceptions to the immunity
rule.
37 The court said: "If by her marriage the relation of parent and child had been finally
dissolved, insofar as that relationship imposed the duty upon the parent to protect and
care for and control, and the child to aid and comfort and obey, then it may be the
child could successfully maintain an action against the parent for personal injuries."
Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891).
88 Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 207,
208 (1967). See Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family--Husband and
Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. Rxv. 152, 194-197 (1961), for a good discussion of
emancipation as it relates to immunity.
89 See Farrar v. Farrar, 152 S.E. 278, 279 (Ga. App. 1930).
40 Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Ore. 1950).
41 "When the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself ceases." Cowgill v. Boock, 218
P.2d 445, 453 (Ore. 1950).
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cious attack by a parent. There is some irony in the realization that the
first three decisions invoking the parent-child immunity doctrine involved circumstances that would amount to a malicious tort, i.e., cir42
cumstances to which the first and most universal exception was applied.
Employer-Employee Relationships
Negligent acts of parents in the course of business activities have
often been distinguished from those which arise from the discharge of
normal parental duties and responsibilities. Suits by a minor child
against his parent have been allowed when the child was injured while
(1) in his father's employment, 4 (2) a passenger in a bus driven by the
father, 44 or (3) an invitee on the premises of his father's business. 45 The

latter case reasoned, that, in lieu of growing complications in business
and industry, it would be an anomaly to allow one minor child to recover for injuries received on the premises of a business, while denying
another the same right on the basis of the fact that the business is owned
46
by his parent.
Thus, the flexibility of the common law is illustrated in the adaptation of the parent-child immunity rule to changing conditions in business and industry.
THE FOUNDATION

COLLAPSES:

JURISDICTIONS WHICH HAVE ABOLISHED THE IMMUNITY RULE

Since 1963, several jurisdictions have abolished the parent-child immunity doctrine. Some of these have abolished it in its entirety, while
others have done so with exceptions or in specific circumstances.
Abrogations with Exceptions for ParentalAuthority and Parental Discretion
In Goller v. White,47 a 1963 Supreme Court of Wisconsin decision,
the first major breakthrough in the parent-child immunity rule was
engineered. In this case, a child was allowed to recover damages against
42 Roller v, Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn.
1903); Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
43 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930).
44 Lusk v. Lusk, 166 S.E. 538 (W. Va. 1932).
45 Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1952). A seven-year-old son was held to have a
cause of action against his father's business partnership for burns sustained from a leaking
gasoline pump.
46 Id. at 748. The court also believed the child should have the same right to maintain
an action in tort against his father in the latter's business capacity as he would have
to maintain an action in relation to his property rights.
47 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
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his foster parent 48 in a suit involving ordinary negligence, under circumstances not falling within any of the heretofore recognized exceptions. After analyzing the reasons for the doctrine, the court abrogated 9
the rule, except in two situations:
(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental
authority over the child; and
(2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.50
Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated the immunity doctrine in all areas in which the court believed it was not supported by
public policy. 51 However, there have been questions as to the extent to
which the Goller exceptions are applied.
In Lemmen v. Servais,5 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was first called
upon to apply these exceptions. In that case, a six-year-old child was
struck by an automobile while crossing in front of a school bus from
which she had alighted. In an action against the driver of the automobile that struck the child, defendant filed a third party complaint against
the child's parents for their negligent failure to properly instruct the
child about safety procedures for leaving the school bus and crossing
the highway. The court held that the parents could not be held negligent because they were acting within the scope of an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to care of their child." In so holding,
the court stated:
The immunity granted by these two exceptions is accorded the parent, not because he is a parent, but because as a parent he pursues
a course within the family constellation which society exacts of him
and which is beneficial to the state. The parental nonliability is not
granted as a reward, but as a means of enabling the parents to discharge the duties which society exacts.54
48 In reference to a foster parent the court said: "One who is possessed of those rights
and duties [of a foster parent) possesses and exercises the rights and duties of a parent
and the relationship existing, is, for all practical purposes, that of parent and child."
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Wis. 1963).
49 The court did not believe a decision to change should be left up to the legislature
when a court-created rule of law was involved. Id. at 198. See also Holytz v. Milwaukee,
115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962), for justification of the court in not leaving it up to the legislature to change a rule of law if it is in the interest of justice.
50 Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963).
511d. The court conduded that the only reason presently existing for the rule is based
on the possibility that such action would disrupt family harmony and parental authority.
52 158 N.W.2d 341 (Wis. 1968).
58 Id. at 343.
54 Id. at 344. The court further said: "The familial obligations imposed by nature
because of the parental relationship, imperfect though they may sometimes be because of
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In a subsequent case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
supervision of a child's play does not involve the exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to provision of food, clothing, housing,
medical and dental services and other care and would not come within
the Goller exception. 55 The court reasoned that although supervision
of a child's play involves an area which is essentially parental, society
does not exact a legal duty with respect to such an obligation, as in the
case of providing a child with food, housing, medical and dental services,
and education.5" This case, therefore, indicates a narrow construction
57
of the exceptions set forth in Goller.
A later Wisconsin case construing the exception relating to parental
care is Thomas v. Kells. 58 The supreme court in this case intimated that

there were many questions not previously answered as to the exact
meaning of the two exceptions. 5 Further, the court found the invitation
to apply the second exception concerning "an exercise of ordinary parental discretion" with respect to the provision of "housing" tempting,
but abstained from dealing with these questions since the case was decided on procedural grounds.60 Thus, Wisconsin and other jurisdictions
which have not totally abrogated the doctrine can expect problems in
defining and applying the parental authority and parental discretion
exceptions.
Two states6 ' have followed Wisconsin in abrogating the immunity
rule with the exception stated therein, while two others6 2 have com-

mended this as a wise decision; and yet another,63 while abrogating the
doctrine, criticized the Wisconsin approach. 64 Although this approach
the ever present common denominator of human behavior, are quite distinct from the

general obligation which the law imposes upon everyone in all his relations to his fellow
men, and for the breach of which it gives a remedy."

55 Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 1970). "The term 'other care' is
not so broad as to cover all acts intimately associated with the parent-child relationship."
Id. at 869.
66 Id. at 869.

57 Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
58 191 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1971).
59 Id. at 874. See Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 1970) and Lemmen
v. Servais, 158 N.W.2d 341 (Wis. 1968) for previous discussion of the exceptions.
60 The decision of the trial court was reversed and the demurrer was overruled on the
basis that the third party complaint against the child's mother did not plead where the
accident took place with such exactitude as to determine the limits of the exception with
respect to parental discretion in provision of housing. Thomas v. Kells, 191 N.W.2d 872,
875 (Wis. 1971).
61 Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631
(Minn. 1968).
62 Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Sup. 1971); Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d
282 (Ariz. 1970).
65 Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
64 1d. at 653. The California court stated: "First, we think that the Goller view will
inevitably result in the drawing of arbitrary distinctions about when particular parental
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does contain the inherent problem of defining the limits of the exceptions, it gives the courts an opportunity to apply the exceptions to cases
in which the reasons for the rule might still exist. Total abrogation, the
area subsequently discussed, leaves no such margin for error.
Total Abrogation
In 1966, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire abolished the immunity doctrine in its entirety.6 5After refuting the family harmony,
parental authority, and danger of fraud reasons usually advanced in
favor of the rule, the court stated:
We further believe that family peace and parental authority, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, will be threatened less by an unemancipated minor's suit for tort against a parent, where the latter
is generally protected from loss by insurance, than by an action for
breach of contract or to enforce property rights where the parent
would ordinarily have to pay a verdict from his own pocket. 66
The Supreme Court of New York in Gelbman v. Gelbman67 abolished
the immunity rule in 1969. The court believed that, in reality, the
litigation was between the parent passenger and her insurance carrier;
therefore, family harmony would not be enhanced by prohibiting the
suit. The court took recognition of the compulsory requirement for automobile insurance in New York. 68 Does this imply that the doctrine
should be invoked where insurance does not exist while abolishing it
when insurance is present?
Following much the same reasoning, three other states-Hawaii,69
California, 70 and Pennsylvania 7' have totally abrogated the immunity

doctrine. This does solve the problem of future litigation in this area.
conduct falls within or without the immunity guidelines. Second, we find intolerable the
notion that if a parent can succeed in bringing himself within the 'safety' of parental
immunity, he may act negligently with impunity."
65 Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966).
66 Id. at 591.
67245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969).
68 Id. at 194. The court stated: "The present litigation is, in reality, between the parent
passenger and her insurance carrier. Viewing the case in this light, we are unable to
comprehend how the family harmony will be enhanced by prohibiting this suit."
69 Peterson v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Hawaii 1969) (amended Jan.
7, 1970). The court's reasoning is as follows: "We think that when a wrong has been committed, the harm to the family relationship has already occurred; and to prohibit reparations can hardly aid in restoring harmony." Id. at 1009.
70 Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971). The California court's decision is based
on the legal principle that "When there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity the
exception." Id. at 653. The court also considered the widespread use of insurance.
71 Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971). The court said: "[W]e have concluded that the
doctrine of parental immunity has no rational purpose today, and henceforth will not be
recognized in Pennsylvania." Id. at 353. Again, the prevalence of liability insurance was
an important consideration in the decision. Id. at 355.
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There will be none. But is a full swing of the pendulum better than a
balance which allows the retention of the doctrine for public policy
reasons in areas where family relationships-areas involving parental
care and authority-still need protection from court interference?
Abrogation with Exception for Acts Involving Parental Relationships
In Schenk v. Schenk, 72 a 1968 Illinois appellate court decision, an
action was allowed by a father against his seventeen-year-old unemancipated daughter for injuries he sustained when she negligently ran into
him with an automobile while he was a pedestrian. The court was of
the opinion that the conduct in this case was wholly unrelated to parental relationship but specified that cases falling within such relationship were to be barred by the immunity doctrine by stating the
following:
[T]here are no impelling reasons for eroding or emasculating the
family immunity rule for conduct of either parent or child arising
out of the family relationship and directly connected with the
family purposes and objectives in those cases where it may be said
that the carelessness, inadvertence or negligence is but the product
of hazards incident to inter-family living and common to every
family3 8
Subsequent Illinois cases have upheld the Schenk decision.7 4 The
most recent Illinois decision allowed an action by two minor daughters
against their mother's estate for injuries alleged to have been caused by
the ordinary negligence of their mother in the operation of a motor
vehicle.7 5 The court allowed the action on grounds that policy reasons
for maintaining immunity no longer existed since the mother was
deceased. 6 Though decided on the above basis, the court did not necessarily agree with the plaintiff's contention that the operation of a motor
vehicle is not a peculiarly parental function.7 7 It believed the intimate
72241 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. 1968).
78Id. at 15.
74 In Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Heap, 262 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. App. 1970),
another Illinois appellate court held that in spite of the presence of liability insurance,
an unemancipated minor child was barred from maintaining an action against his father
for personal injuries caused by his father's alleged negligence in permitting a loose, illfitting stairway rug to be used in the family home. Since the complaint alleged mere negligence, the court believed the parent-child immunity rule applied, it being consistent with
Illinois Supreme Court dicta and sound public policy.
A later case reiterated that no cause of action would be allowed for mere negligence,
though one would be allowed for willful torts. Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 268 N.E.2d
552 (II. App. 1971).

75 Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. 1972).
76 Id. at 779.

77 The plaintiff made this contention on the theory that the parent owes the same duty
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and necessary part that a motor vehicle plays in accomplishing many
family purposes in today's society could bring ordinary negligence in
the use of an automobile within the parental function exception.7
This is a doubtful proposition, in that negligence in the use of an automobile hardly involves any parental discretion.
Abrogation Limited Solely to Automobile Accidents
Alaska, 79 Arizona,80 New Jersey,81 and Virginia 2 have abrogated the
parent-child immunity doctrine only insofar as it relates to negligence
in automobile accidents.88 This route appears to dispose of the largest
quantity of litigations involving the parent-child immunity rule and
affords more time for investigating the feasibility of theories presented
by other courts.
Thus, it is apparent that there is little uniformity even among those
states which have abolished the parent-child immunity rule. This lack
of uniformity leaves several choices for other jurisdictions to analyze
84
before arriving at a decision when confronted with this problem.
TEXAS
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE

In Garza v. Garza,8 5 Texas was first confronted with a situation where
to others as she does to her children who are passengers. Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778,
779 (Ill.
App. 1972).
78 Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (Ill. App. 1972). The court merely discussed
this issue; they did not decide it.
79 Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967).
80 Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970).
81 France v. A.P.A. Transport Co., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970).
82 Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971). The Virginia court also considered the
application of that state's guest statute to such an action by a minor. The Virginia guest
statute states that a person transported in a motor vehicle ".... as a guest without payment
for such transportation . . ." cannot recover for death or injuries resulting from the
operation of the motor vehicle except upon proof of the owner's or operator's gross negligence or willful and wanton conduct. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957). The court ruled that
a child can become a guest in a motor vehicle and subject himself to the gross negligence
rule only if he can knowingly and voluntarily accept an invitation to become a guest.
Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190, 195 (Va. 1971). The court then set a dividing line
between those children who cannot knowingly and voluntarily accept an invitation to
become a guest. They held that a child under the age of fourteen years is incapable of
knowingly and voluntarily accepting an invitation to become a guest in an automobile so
as to subject himself to the gross negligence rule. Id. at 195.
88 Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (Ariz.
1970); France v. A.P.A. Transport Co., 267 A.2d 490, 495 (N.J. 1970); Smith v. Kauffman,
183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (Va. 1971).
84 Not all states recently confronted with litigation in this area have elected to abolish
or modify the parent-child immunity rule. See Latz v. Latz, 272 A.2d 434 (Md. 1971);
Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971). The court in the latter case was of the
oPinion that the judiciary should be reluctant to encourage actions by children against
ir parents. Id. at 101.
85 209 S.W.2d 1012 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1948, no writ).
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the parent-child immunity doctrine could be applied. The question was
whether or not a child had a cause of action against a father who had
deserted him, for loss of his society, love, companionship, and guidance.
In holding that the child did not have a cause of action, the court quoted
the following excerpt from Ruling Case Law as authority:
It is well established that a minor child cannot sue his parent for a
tort. The peace of society... and a sound public policy, designed
to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society,
forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion
of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands
of the parent.8 6
The court concluded that while the plaintiffs were not suing for personal injuries, the parent-child immunity rule would certainly apply to
87
a suit to recover for the loss of society.
The Forth Worth Court of Civil Appeals in Aboussie v. Aboussie88
was called upon to apply the parent-child immunity doctrine in a suit
by a minor child against his parent for personal injuries. After pointing
out that there was no evidence of willful, malicious, wanton, or intentional wrong-doing on the part of the parent, the court denied recovery
and said:
We believe that the peace and tranquility of the home and the
best interest of minor children will be subserved by following the
general rule that an unemancipated minor child cannot sue its parent for damages based on acts of ordinary negligence.89
The court further stated that the suit was against a parent, regardless
of the fact that the unemancipated child was suing her father as a member of a partnership along with his brother and sister.90
Though the application of the parent-child immunity rule was not
widely litigated in Texas, its development was typical of that in other
jurisdictions.
FELDERHOFF v. FELDERHOFF

The first blow to the foundation of the parent immunity doctrine
in Texas is the late 1971 supreme court decision of Felderhoff v. Felder8s Id. at 1015.
87 Id. at 1015.
88 270 S.W.2d 636 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd).
89 Id. at 639.
90 Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ

ref'd).
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hoff. 91 The plaintiff, a fourteen-year-old unemancipated minor, received
injuries when his arm became caught in an auger of a large combine
owned and operated by a partnership of which his father was a member.
It was alleged that the plaintiff's father was negligent in letting his
foot slip and strike a lever which put the auger in motion, while
the plaintiff was scraping out excess grain and chaff within the grain
auger. The trial court granted the defendant partnership summary
judgment on the basis that a parent is immune from a suit involving
ordinary negligence when brought by his unemancipated child. The
court extended the immunity doctrine to include the partnership of
which the father was a member. The court of civil appeals, believing itself to be bound by precedent, affirmed with some reluctance. 92 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed, abolishing the parent-child immunity
rule insofar as it involves an employer-employee relationship. The court
was apparently urged to consider the presence of insurance as had
other jurisdictions, but clearly declined to do so. 93 In refuting the
argument that to allow such an action would open the door to fraud
and collusion, the court said:
We believe that our laws and judicial system are adequate to ferret
out and prevent collusion if and when proper allegations and proof
are presented in a particular case without the necessity of adopting
an absolute immunity rule which would apply to this and all other
cases in which no collusion is alleged. 4
The court then distinguished between acts of parents in the course
of business activities and acts arising from the discharge of normal
parental duties and responsibilities. The reason for making this distinction was given as follows:
The legal relationship of employer and employee was created
between the defendant partnership and plaintiff under which the
same legal duties were owed to plaintiff as to any other employee.
These duties and their concomitant liabilities are not nullified by
reason of the fact that the father was a member of the partnership
and that he is alleged to have committed the negligent acts which
resulted in the injuries complained of. 95
The court could have ended its opinion at this point and merely
91 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
92 Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 470 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ

granted).
93 Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
94 Id. at 932.
95 Id. at 933.
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joined those jurisdictions which have allowed actions between parent
and child when the negligence occurred in an employer-employee
relationship.96 The court directly stated that its holding was to be
limited to employer-employee relationships. 97 Nevertheless, insight as
to the future of the parent-child immunity doctrine as applied to other
parent-child relationships may be gained in analyzing the remainder
of the opinion dealing with the possibility of total abrogation responding to plaintiff's argument of that point. While the court responded that
this was neither "required nor appropriate in the present case," it
did proceed to give its opinion of decisions in other jurisdictions. The
court stated:
We trust that it is not out of date for the state and its courts to be
concerned with the welfare of the family as the most vital unit in
our society. We recognize that peace, tranquility and discipline
in the home are endowed and inspired by higher authority than
statutory enactments and court decisions. Harmonious family relationships depend on filial and parental love and respect which can
neither be created nor preserved by legislatures or courts. The most
we can do is to prevent the judicial system from being used to disrupt the wide sphere of reasonable discretion which is necessary
in order for parents to properly nurture, care, and discipline for
their children. These parental duties, which usually include the
provision of a home, food, schooling, family chores, medical care
and recreation, could be seriously impaired and retarded if parents
were to be held liable to lawsuits by their unemancipated minor
children for unintentional errors or ordinary negligence occurring
while in the discharge of such parental duties and responsibilities.
It is in this sphere of family relations between parent and child that
the rule of immunity from litigation continues to find justification
and validity. 8
While it must be understood that the above well-presented views are
not now Texas law, they do indicate the underlying principles which
will be foremost in the court's thinking when it is presented with the
problem of retaining or abolishing the parent-child immunity rule.
The court faced this problem in the application for writ of Wallace v.
Wallace.99 The court granted writ and would have faced this issue
squarely but for the fact that it was settled before a decision could be
96 E.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1963); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A.
905 (N.H. 1930); Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1952).
97

Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (rex. Sup. 1971).

98 Id.
99 466 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ dism'd) (writ was granted but

later dismissed at request of the parties).
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rendered. The fact that writ was applied for and granted indicates that
the court may be willing and ready to consider a change. 100
CONCLUSION

Does a child's right of redress for a tort occasioned by the negligence
of a parent actually impair family harmony or parental authority? If
so, in the balance of justice, which is to prevail? The fact that different
jurisdictions have taken varying positions in regard to the answers to
these questions indicates that there is no set solution. Total immunity
or complete abolishment ignores either the right of a child to redress
for a tort committed by a parent without regard to the circumstances
or the duty of the court to prevent actions that would actually interfere
with family relationships.
In looking favorably upon the Wisconsin approach, the Texas court
has indicated preference of a rule which will abolish immunity when
no reason for it exists, yet retain it where disruption of family life appears imminent.
Should Texas follow this approach, it appears that suits arising from
the negligent use of an automobile would be allowed on the theory that
negligence of that type does not involve parental authority or parental
discretion. In such a case, the court would probably be urged to take
recognition of the prevalence of automobile liability insurance. To
base a decision on the presence of insurance could lead to unacceptable
results, i.e., carried to its extreme, vicarious liability for all injuries
caused, regardless of negligence, if insurance is present.
The willingness of courts to re-evaluate laws in light of changing conditions reveals the continuing development of justice.
The law is not fossilized. It is a growth. It grows more just with
the growing humanity of the age and broadens "with the process
of the suns. 01
100 Calvert, Application for Writ of Error, in ArPELLATE PROCEDURE IN TEXAS § 22.14
(0. Walker and J. Hebdon eds. 1964) (a State Bar publication).
101 Pressley v. Yarn Mills, 51 S.E. 69, 74 (N.C. 1905) (Clark, C.J., concurring opinion).
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